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INTRODUCTION
When we communicate one thing, we often unavoidably send other
messages. To start with a simple example, imagine that Ian says to Barry,
"My mother's name is Karen." From Ian's communication, Barry learns
more than just the underlying bit of information (mom's name). The
communication also lets Barry know that: (a) Ian knows his mom's name,
and (b) Ian knows that Barry knows Ian's mom's name.
What is less well understood is that when we teach, we learn. When
Ian tells Barry about his mom, Ian learns several things. For example, by
* William K. Townsend Professor, Yale Law School. < http://elsinore.cis.yale.edulawweb/
faculty/ayrespub.htm >.
** Milton Steinbach Professor, Yale School of Management. <http://mayet.som.yale.edu/
coopetition>. Conversations with Bruce Ackerman, Adam Brandenburger, Jennifer Brown, Clark
Freshman, Eric Green, and Kenji Yoshino were very helpful. We want them to know we appreciate
their help and know, too, that we know they know how helpful they were.
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telling Barry, Ian now knows that Barry knows Karen is the name of Ian's
mom. Direct communication of a fact can potentially create two infinite
series of knowledge.1 If we symbolize the underlying bit of information
(Karen is Ian's mom) as &g), then Ian's communication might create the
following hierarchy of beliefs:
TABLE 1: POTENTIAL HIERARCHY OF BELIEFS
Ian's Knowledge Barry's Knowledge
la. Ian knows () lb. Barry knows(g)
2a. Ian knows Barry knows (K) 2b. Barry knows Ian knows (R)
3a. Ian knows that Barry 3b. Barry knows that Ian
knows that Ian knows (g) knows that Barry knows (R)
and so on... and so on...
If Ian's communication succeeds in creating both of these infinite
series, economists would say that the underlying fact is "common knowl-
edge." 2 Table 1 makes clear how directly communicating a simple fact can
produce other types of knowledge. Ian begins with what we will call "first-
1. Of course, for this to happen, it must be apparent to both the speaker and listener that
the listener heard and understood what the speaker was saying. In many contexts, it will be
unclear whether the listener received the message. (Indeed, we will argue that such ambiguity
may not facilitate settlement.) But in other contexts-for example, if Barry's response confirms
that he understands ("Oh really, my mother is named Karen too")-it will be clear as a practical
matter that common knowledge is created.
2. The term is usually defined more compactly: "Something is common knowledge if it is
known to each player, and, in addition, each player knows that the other player has this knowl-
edge; knows that the other person knows the player knows it; and so forth." DOUGLAS G. BAIRD
ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 304 (1994).
For pioneering work on common knowledge, see Adam Brandenburger, Knowledge and
Equilibrium in Games, 6 J. ECON. PERSP. 83 (1992). See also Robert J. Aumann, Agreeing to
Disagree, 4 ANNALS OF STAT. 1236 (1976); John Geanakoplos, Common Knowledge, 6 J. EcoN.
PERSP. 53 (1992); Paul Milgrom & Nancy Stokey, Information, Trade and Common Knowledge, 26
J. EcoN. THEORY 17 (1982).
In both common parlance and the common law, the term "common knowledge" merely
means that an underlying piece of information is generally known. See, e.g., Garrison v.
Heublein, Inc., 673 F.2d 189, 192 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that vodka was not unreasonably
dangerous because the dangers involved in the use of alcohol are "common knowledge");
Caldwell v. Knight, 92 Ga. Ct. App. 747, 89 S.E.2d 900 (1955) (stating that the "common
knowledge" doctrine does not require expert evidence when the reasonableness of the defendant's
conduct involves matters within the collective common knowledge of the jury). In terms of
Table 1, this definition only requires "first-order" knowledge (la and lb) and not the higher-order
knowledge required under the game-theoretic definition.
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order" information (la) and wants to convey this to Barry (1b). But in
doing so, Ian may be teaching Barry "higher-order" information as well (2b,
3b, 4b, etc.). Moreover, by teaching Barry, Ian may unavoidably acquire
higher-order information himself (2a, 3a, 4a, etc.).'
Now, for something like "my mom's name is Karen," it doesn't matter
that "I know you know" and "you know I know you know," but in other
situations it does. Indeed, the purpose of this Article is to show that during
negotiations, parties will often want to communicate first-order infor-
mation, but will not want to communicate to others (or teach themselves)
higher-order information. We will show that common knowledge itself can
be a barrier to efficient negotiation. Even when the communication of
first-order knowledge facilitates agreement, the acquisition of higher-order
knowledge at times can cause negotiations to unravel.
Our thesis contradicts accepted wisdom. In many negotiation models,
common knowledge of crucial facts would facilitate trade.4  In these
models private information is a "transaction cost" that can impede nego-
tiation.5 But we will show that preserving ignorance about higher-order
information can actually promote trade.
This is where mediation comes in. Mediators can break the link
between communicating first-order information and communicating higher-
order pieces of information. If a mediator caucuses first with Ian and then
tells Barry (g), Barry will have acquired the first-order knowledge, but he
may not know that Ian knows & (2b), and Ian may not know that Barry
knows (K) (2a), and so forth.6 The use of caucus mediation can usefully
prevent (K) from becoming common knowledge between Ian and Barry.
3. Notice that these two infinite series are linked together in a kind of "double-helix"
structure. In its strongest sense, (3a) implies (2b), which in turn implies (la); and, (3b) implies
(2a), which implies (lb). Higher-order knowledge implies certain forms of lower-order knowledge
(but not vice versa). However, if Barry and Ian merely "believe" certain things-and hence may
be mistaken-then a higher-order belief (for instance, 3a) would not necessarily imply a lower-
order belief (2b).
4. See MARTIN J. OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, A COURSE IN GAME THEORY
117-31 (1994).
5. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995).
6. In caucus mediation, it is true that:
(a) when Ian tells the mediator, (&) may become common knowledge between Ian and the
mediator; and
(b) when the mediator tells Barry, (&) may become common knowledge between the
mediator and Barry.
But, making (&) common knowledge between the mediator and each of the individual parties may
not be as destructive to negotiation as making (g) common knowledge between the individual
parties themselves-because the mediator will usually not have an ongoing relationship with the
individual parties.
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Caucus mediation can communicate (9) (first-order knowledge) without
creating common, higher-order knowledge among the parties. Moreover,
even without caucus mediation, certain existing, indirect modes of speech
might still communicate first-order information without creating common-
knowledge problems. Though there is a trade off: communicating
indirectly reduces the chance that the listener will understand the first-
order information but reduces the chances of communicating higher-order
information.
In this Article, we will work through a series of examples showing how
mediators can facilitate agreement by preventing the creation of common
knowledge. 7  In each example, the communication of first-order infor-
mation ((E)) lubricates trade, but the communication of higher-order infor-
mation impedes trade. Direct communication at times is unhelpful because
the listener also learns higher-order information (Barry knows that Ian
knows (9)), and at other times it is unhelpful because the speaker learns
higher-order information (Ian knows that Barry knows () that he would
prefer not to know.
Our examples are organized around the "value claiming"/"value
creation" dichotomy introduced by David Lax and James Sebenius. Com-
municating first-order information can be valuable in either type of nego-
tiation. In distributive negotiations (value claiming), it is often useful for
one side to communicate to the other side "You are claiming too much,
because .... ." In integrative negotiations (value creating), it is often useful
for one side to communicate "You could create more value if you
would ......
The problem is the ellipses. First-order information often concerns
threats and insults. In a distributive negotiation, it can be both individually
and jointly useful for one party to explain why the other side's best alter-
native to negotiated agreement (BATNA) is lower than she thinks.9 The
problem is that the way a party makes the other side's BATNA low is
7. Our Article extends the thesis of Jennifer Brown and Ian Ayres that the uniquely medi-
ative role for mediators is to control the flow of information between the parties. See Jennifer
Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales for Mediation, 80 VA. L. REV. 323 (1994).
8. See DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR 117-53
(1986). In distributive negotiations-in which the parties are merely trying to determine whether
there are gains from trade and how to divide them-value claiming predominates as parties rival-
rously claim different shares of the gains from trade. In contrast, integrative negotiations present
opportunities for the parties to create additional value by varying the terms of trade-so the par-
ties must engage in a mixture of "value claiming" and "value creating" activity.
9. See infra note 24. A negotiator wants her adversary to have a weak BATNA. More
than that, she wants her adversary to believe that she has a weak BATNA because, ultimately,
her adversary's perceptions will determine her willingness to agree.
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typically not very nice: "In the absence of an agreement, you will have a
low payoff because we will do something that will hurt you (break off rela-
tions, bring suit, etc.)." But higher-order information about threats can
destroy value. If it becomes common knowledge that Ian has threatened
Barry, then Barry may be reluctant to trust Ian. And Ian (the threatener)
may be less likely to trust Barry. After all, how can Ian trust Barry if Ian
knows that Barry knows that Ian is willing to exploit weakness?
Common knowledge can also inhibit integrative bargaining. To tell
the other side how she could increase the joint gains from trade often
entails revealing existing weaknesses about the other side. To create addi-
tional value, a party sometimes needs to implicitly insult the other side. As
with threats, insults that become common knowledge can destroy value.
An employer might want to tell an employee that they could jointly have a
more valuable relationship if the employee stopped stealing. But, directly
communicating this information can make both the employer and the
employee less willing to continue the relationship. How can the employee
continue to work with someone who knows she has been stealing? And
how can the employer continue to employ someone who knows that steal-
ing is allowed?
It is often difficult to prevent second-order information from being
communicated along with first-order information. If I tell a mediator a
particular threat, I have a pretty good idea that the other side will be
told. 10 But it is less certain whether the other side will know that I know
(and even less certain I will know that the other side knows that I know).
Because higher-order knowledge is contingent on a chain of beliefs, uncer-
tainty at lower levels may become exponentially magnified at higher
levels." Even when mediators cannot prevent the communication of
second-order information, they can successfully create uncertainty about the
more attenuated forms of higher-order information. 2 And we will show
10. Some mediators claim they will only pass on information with a speaker's consent, but
in practice, mediators indirectly disclose information garnered from one side during caucusing.
See Jonathan M. Hyman, The Model Mediator Confidentiality Rule, 12 SEToN HALL LEGIS. J. 17
(1988); see also Brown & Ayres, supra note 7, at 391-92.
11. If there is an 80% chance that first-order knowledge is communicated, an 80% chance
that the sender knows about the communication, and an 80% chance that the receiver knows
that the sender knows, then there is only a 51% chance of third-order knowledge (0.8 x 0.8 x
0.8).
12. Professors Susskind and Cruikshank, for example, have described how mediators can
preserve uncertainty in caucus mediation:
A skilled intermediary can, in private meetings with the other participants, explore
whether they would be willing to give up Y and Z in exchange for X. This might be
phrased, "What if I could get them to give up X? Would you trade Y and Z?" Of course,
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that controlling third- and fourth-order information can at times bene-
ficially affect negotiations.
The remainder of the Article is organized in three parts. Part I shows
how negotiations can be crucially affected by beliefs about higher-order
information. Part II presents a series of examples concerning "value claim-
ing" talk. Part III discusses examples concerning "value creating" talk.
I. THE IMPACT OF HIGHER-ORDER INFORMATION
ON STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR
A problem with most game-theoretic models is that they make one of
two extreme assumptions about information. They either assume that
particular pieces of information ((g)) are private information, or they assume
that particular pieces of information are common knowledge. But as our
previous discussion makes clear, there are literally an infinite number of
intermediate assumptions that might be made. This discussion will show
that assuming common knowledge is not just an innocuous proxy for situa-
tions in which both parties know a particular fact. Even when both sides
know a particular piece of first-order information, the parties' beliefs about
higher-order information can crucially affect how they behave and shape
the ensuing equilibrium. For now, we will not concern ourselves with how
players acquire information; we seek only to establish that higher-order
information matters.
A. Example No. 1: How Big Is the Strike Fund?
To illustrate the importance of higher-order beliefs, we will begin with
a story about a labor negotiation occurring before and possibly during a
strike. For the sake of argument, imagine that both Labor and Manage-
ment are intransigent, having made incompatible take-it-or-leave-it offers
concerning job security. The only way to resolve the dispute will be for
the neutral already knows that such a trade is possible. He or she must phrase the ques-
tion, though, in a what-if format to protect the confidentiality of the information secured
earlier.
LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE: CONSENSUAL
APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 147 (1987).
Brown and Ayres have suggested that mediators should be more forthright about how they
indirectly disclose caucus information. See Brown & Ayres, supra note 7, at 327, 392. But our
analysis suggests that in a caucus mediation, the disputants may want the mediator to simultane-
ously: (a) reveal caucus information, and (b) say that she is not revealing. The fiction of mediator
confidentiality may be a useful device to preserve uncertainty about higher-order information.
1636 44 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1631 (1997)
HeinOnline -- 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1636 1996-1997
Common Knowledge
one side to cave in and accept the other's position. 13 The question is who
will concede.
Let us further assume that the cost of the strike is $10,000 a day for
Labor and $30,000 a day for Management. However, Management is better
capitalized: Management's strike fund is $3,000,000, and Labor's strike fund
is $700,000. Accordingly, Management can afford to hold out for one
hundred days whereas Labor's strike fund will be exhausted at the end of
seventy days.' 4 (We assume that when the funding runs out, a party has
to concede and the strike ends.)
Although Management can afford to wait one hundred days, it is not
in Management's economic interest to do so. Management figures that
giving into Labor's demands will cost it (in present discounted value) a total
of $1 million. Hence, if the strike were to last more than thirty-three days,
it would be better for Management to simply give in today.'" For Labor,
the strike is much more valuable. The present value of the job security it
has demanded is worth $600,000.16 Consequently, Labor would be willing
to strike for sixty days if that is what it took to win. Should it anticipate
that the strike would take more than sixty days, then it would not be worth
fighting-even if Labor thought that it would ultimately win.
Given this scenario, who do we expect to win the conflict? At first
glance, it looks as though Labor is willing to fight longer than Management
(Labor has the incentive and sufficient resources to hold out past Manage-
ment's break-even threshold). So it should be the victor. Anticipating
this, Management might as well give in right away.
But as you might suspect, the parties' optimal behavior is more subtle
and critically depends on beliefs about beliefs. To keep things as simple as
possible, we assume that Management's and Labor's daily strike costs
($30,000 and $10,000, respectively), Management's strike fund
($3,000,000), and Management's and Labor's cost of conceding ($1,000,000
13. A dichotomous outcome might be caused by an indivisible contract term, such as job
security.
14. For example, while our example is stylized, the size of strike funds powerfully affects
labor negotiations. American Airlines and its pilots negotiated a recent dispute in the shadow of
similar strike consequences. See Tom Stieghorst, Deregulation, Unions: Airline Industry's Rocky
Ride, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, FL), Feb. 9, 1997, at 14A ("American has $1 billion in
profits socked away ....").
15. Even if management knew that it could ultimately win in 34 days, the strike would cost
management $1,020,000 (34 x $30,000), and the wage concession would only save management
$1,000,000.
16. Job security might cost Management more than it benefits Labor if it makes production
less efficient.
1637
HeinOnline -- 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1637 1996-1997
44 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1631 (1997)
and $600,000, respectively) are all common knowledge. 7 We focus solely
on the players' beliefs about the size of Labor's strike fund ($700,000) to
show that higher-order beliefs about the fund can crucially affect the length
of the strike.
To understand the play of the game, we need to consider what would
happen at all possible points in the game. Let's analyze the players' optimal
behavior at the end of the game and then work backward. The game can-
not last longer than seventy days because Labor would need to concede
after this point. If the players reach the seventieth day, what should
Management do? If Management knows Labor's budget constraint, then it
shouldn't concede. By holding out a single additional day (costing
$30,000), Management can assure itself that Labor will concede (producing
a $1,000,000 benefit). Even though holding out for seventy days produces
a net loss for Management,"8 from the perspective of the seventieth day,
the costs of past strike days are "sunk" and therefore should not affect
Management's decision on whether to continue.
Indeed, this logic suggests that if Management knows the size of
Labor's strike fund, Management's dominant strategy is not to concede
after day 37. Upon day 37, Management will have to wait no more than
thirty-three days to be assured of winning the strike, and the incremental
cost of holding out from this point on is worthwhile.' 9 Of course, we
haven't yet determined if Management will want to hold out until day 37,
but if it does, Management will continue to hold out. For the sake of nota-
tion, we will call the fact that Labor has only a seventy-day strike fund (E.
Our first conclusion, therefore, is that Management should stay in the game
from day 37 onward if it knows G.
17. For simplicity, we also assume no discounting of future profits.
18. ($1,000,000- 70 x $30,000 = -$1,100,000)
19. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats
to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1996).
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If Labor knows that Management knows (L, then at any point after day
37, Labor should quit immediately. That is, the consequence of Manage-
ment knowing ( is that Management will not be giving in; once Labor
understands this (by knowing that Management knows ([), Labor might as
well save the otherwise-wasted strike costs and give in today.
What if Management knows that Labor knows that Management
knows (©? Then Management shouldn't quit if it ever reaches day 4 of the
strike. The reason is that if Management can hold on until day 37-which
is only thirty-three days away-Management knows it will then win right
away. Management knows that on day 37 Labor will see the handwriting
on the wall and then concede immediately. Therefore, Management's
holding out after day 4 is worthwhile because the wait will at most be
thirty-three days until victory.
To make the next step in the argument requires that Labor knows that
Management knows that Labor knows that Management knows (E. In that
event, Labor should concede right away at day 4. Labor can predict at day
4 that the game will be over on day 37 with Labor conceding, so it might as
well concede now.
Of course, if Management knows that Labor knows that Management
knows that Labor knows that Management knows (E), then it should surely
not concede on even the first day. All Management has to do is wait until
day 4 to be victorious. Four days is a small price to pay.
The final step of the argument arises if we can say that Labor knows
that Management knows that Labor knows that Management knows that
Labor knows that Management knows (ED. It's a mouthful. If true, Labor
might as well give in right away. The alternative is to strike for four days
and then concede.
It seems that by using backward induction we have "solved" the game.
The predicted result is that Labor will concede immediately. But that
conclusion requires some very strong assumptions about higher-order knowl-
edge. In particular, we can confidently predict that Labor will immediately
concede only if we are willing to assume the existence of sixth-order
1639
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information. 0 It might very well be the case that both Management and
Labor know (L). Labor might even know that Management knows 0. But
Management isn't sure of this fact. Hence it can't count on Labor giving in
on day 37. Since it's not worth fighting thirty-seven days to win, Manage-
ment could, in full rationality, decide to concede right away. In fact, it
could even decide to concede on any day between 1 and 36.21
B. Example No. 2: Rationality and the Prisoner's Dilemma
Critics of economics often attack the assumption that individuals are
rational. But, in many contexts, the unexamined assumption that ration-
ality is common knowledge can have profound effects on how players
behave. Assuming that the rationality of each of the players is common
knowledge is much stronger than merely assuming each player is rational.
20. We can restate this example in terms of Table 1 by re-labelling Ian = Labor; Barry =
Management; and () = 0 = first-order information that Labor's strike fund is $700,000. Our




(lb) Management knows (L) Management will hold out from day 37 on
(2a) Labor knows Management knows © Labor concedes on day 37
(3b) Management knows Labor knows Management will hold out from day 4 on
Management knows 0
(4a) Labor knows Management knows Labor Labor concedes on day 4
knows Management knows (C)
(5b) Management knows Labor knows Management will hold out from day 1 on
Management knows Labor knows
Management knows (
(6a) Labor knows Management knows Labor Labor concedes on day 1
knows Management knows Labor knows
Management knows (L)
This example exploits the "double-helix" structure of iterated knowledge, discussed supra note 3,
in that we assume (6a) implies (5b), which implies (4a), and so on.
21. In this stylized example, Management would have every reason to communicate that it
knows the size of Labor's strike fund in order to make (C) common knowledge. But in later exam-
ples, both parties will be better off if higher-order information is not produced.
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We might not want to abandon the notion of rationality, but we may want
to relax the notion of common knowledge of rationality. Doing so allows
for markedly different equilibrium behaviors.
To explore how higher-order knowledge about rationality can affect a
game, let's look at a prisoner's dilemma game that is repeated a finite num-
ber of times. Our point here is not to show how higher-order knowledge
about rationality affects negotiations, but to show more generally how
higher-order knowledge can affect equilibrium behavior.
First, let's analyze the case in which there is only one iteration. If you
are rational, you should defect. Period. End of discussion." And the
only requirement is rationality. It doesn't matter whether you think the
other person is rational or not. Defecting is the dominant strategy if you
are rational.
Now, let's look at a two-iteration version. Defecting in the first period
is now only a dominant strategy if you are rational and if you believe that I
am rational. If you think I might not be rational, it might make sense for
you to cooperate in the first period to induce me to cooperate in the second
period.
Finally, let's look at a three-iteration version. What is a sufficient
assumption for you to defect in the first period? Well, you know that you
will defect next period if (at the beginning of next period) I believe you are
rational. Because if I think that you are rational (even after seeing you
cooperate in the first period), I will believe that you will defect in the third
period, and therefore I will defect in the second period. Since I will defect
in the second period, you might as well defect in the first. It is your belief
about my belief of your rationality that is crucial. And so, if you believe
that I am rational, and if you believe that I will think that you are rational
even if I see you cooperate in the first period, then you will want to defect
in the first period.
The take-home lesson is that in a finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
game, the unique equilibrium is defect-defect in all rounds if the players
have sufficiently higher-order beliefs about rationality. The order of beliefs
about beliefs about rationality has to be commensurate with the number of
repeat plays. We don't have to assume that the players are irrational to
produce cooperation. It may be sufficient-and more reasonable-to simply
assume that rationality is not common knowledge (and does not extend to
22. Defection is the dominant strategy for a rational player in a one-shot prisoner's dilemma
game because defection produces a high payoff for a player regardless of her beliefs about how the
other player will behave.
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order levels higher than the number of rounds). 3 This "resolution" of the
finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma shows how assumptions concerning
seemingly attenuated, higher-order knowledge can dramatically affect the
play of the game.
II. "VALUE CLAIMING" TALK
We turn our attention now to how communication during negotiations
can affect both first- and higher-order information. In a negotiation, it is
useful for each party to know the maximum and minimum price at which a
deal might be struck. ADR theorists tend to refer to these extremes as each
party's BATNA; economists tend to use the term "reservation price. '24
But whatever the names,2" misinformation about either of these extremes
can impede negotiation. For example, a seller who is misinformed about
the buyer's reservation price may demand a price that exceeds the
maximum amount a buyer is willing to pay. Poor information about
BATNAs can impede trade because a party may mistakenly demand more
gains from trade than actually exist. To prevent this inefficiency, it will be
both individually and socially useful for negotiators to credibly
communicate information about both their own and the other side's
reservation price. These communications take the generic form:
(a) Your BATNA is weaker than you think, and
(b) My BATNA is stronger than you think. 6
23. Cooperation can also be induced in infinitely repeated games if the future is sufficiently
important (that is, the discount rate is sufficiently small). See ROBERT AXELROD, THE
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 124-41 (1984).
24. ADR theorists might not equate BATNA with a reservation price because they are
reluctant to monetize the "best alternative." But when a BATNA is easily monetizable, the two
concepts are identical. For example, if Yale is negotiating to buy electricity from a local supplier
and Yale knows that it can buy as much as it wants out of state at 34/kw, then we could say that
this outside offer represents either Yale's BATNA or its reservation price.
25. We prefer to analyze negotiations in terms of "added value." The most favorable payoff
any party can hope for is that party's added value. See ADAM M. BRANDENBURoER & BARRY J.
NALEBUFF, CO-OPETITION 45 (1996).
26. These are not the only examples of "value claiming" talk. For example, if you are
reluctant to negotiate because you mistakenly believe that there are no gains from trade, I might
want to tell you: "My BATNA is lower than you think." In Example No. 6, we will also discuss
an example dealing with lying, in which one party wants to communicate: "I know (what you
already know) that your BATNA isn't as strong you are claiming it is." See infra Part II.A.4.
And as we discuss at the end of this section, "value claiming" talk can relate to any primitive of
a distributive bargaining model. See infra Part II.B.
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But these coolly rational communications are often backed up by hot
threats that can impede settlement if the threats become common
knowledge.
A. Don't Claim So Much Because Your BATNA Isn't as Strong as You
Think
Each of the four examples in this section involve threats. Remember,
our primary goal is to show that first-order communication of threats can
facilitate settlement, but higher-order communication (that is, the threat
becoming "common knowledge") can impede settlement. If we succeed in
establishing this, it is straightforward to show that mediators can help
achieve these competing objectives by passing on first-order information
while filtering higher-order knowledge.
1. Example No. 3: A Threat of Divorce
Imagine a husband and wife who are having trouble in their rela-
tionship. The husband might say, "Honey, I want this relationship to
work, but if you can't make these changes then I want a divorce." Some
spouses would respond to this type of "threat" by saying: "You got it." The
husband might reply, "I didn't want the divorce, I wanted the changes."
But by this point, it may be too late. 7
The problem is that the husband's threat communicated not only the
consequences of maintaining the status quo but higher-order information as
well. The wife now knows that the husband is contemplating a divorce,
and the husband knows that the wife knows this.2" The wife might not be
willing to see a marriage counselor or try to work something out if she
thinks her husband has one foot out the door. The wife can't pretend not
to know, and the husband can't pretend that the wife doesn't know.
The higher-order information can make each side more reluctant to
stay in the marriage. The wife is reluctant to stay in a marriage when the
27. We know of an engagement threat that is all too close to this example. After wedding
invitations had been sent, the bride-to-be raised the possibility of postponing the ceremony. The
groom-to-be responded in no uncertain terms. "If you postpone the wedding, I will never marry
you." This statement caused the engagement to quickly unravel. The bride-to-be could not
marry someone who would make such an explicit threat.
28. In terms of Table 1, (R) is the fact that the husband is contemplating divorce. The
husband's threat not only communicates Ig) (lb), but also communicates higher-order information.
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husband knows she is knuckling under to a threat. And even if she was
willing, the husband may think that given her current knowledge, she
wouldn't really be committed to change, and thus he isn't willing to make
the commitment. The higher-order information that the husband learns
when he threatens can make him less willing to stay in the marriage. Com-
mon knowledge of the threat destroys the possibility of mutual trust and
commitment.
Savvy mediators (marriage counselors) can help the couple see the
consequences of their actions-without creating common knowledge. In
essence, it is useful for the wife to understand that her BATNA is not as
strong as she thinks it is. She may mistakenly think that she can keep the
status quo and preserve her marriage. The marriage counselor (after talking
privately with the husband) might ask the wife: "What do you think will
happen if you stay on the current course?" or (if that doesn't do the trick),
"Do you think your marriage might end if nothing changes?" Of course,
the wife might infer that even the first, more indirect question has its roots
in a threat that the husband communicated to the mediator. But if done
well, the mediator can convey the message while retaining sufficient uncer-
tainty on both the husband's and wife's sides about higher-order
information.
2. Example No. 4: An Opportunistic Threat
The disruptive effects of direct threats apply equally well to business
settings. Imagine a negotiation between two corporations concerning a
contract renewal to supply certain goods on January 30. The supplier might
try to negotiate a higher price by saying on January 15: "Look, we are the
only company in a position to produce the goods right now for you, so if
you want your supply on January 30, here's the price and you better sign
this contract or your factory is going to get shut down." The buyer might
sign the contract because she has no alternative. As in the divorce exam-
ple, the supplier in essence is trying to tell the other side that she has a
weaker BATNA than she realizes: If the buyer doesn't agree to pay the
higher price, she will be left with no goods at all. But the buyer's BATNA
is weaker because of the seller's opportunism. The seller is threatening to
do something it may have a legal right to do but that violates any norm of a
"partnership" orientation.
Directly communicating this threat might cause the relationship to
end, because the threat becomes common knowledge between the two
companies. The threat might force the buyer ultimately to break off the
relationship because the buyer realizes that the seller has already actively
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considered opportunism.29 Once the buyer knows that the seller doesn't
have a "partnership" orientation, the buyer might well choose not to con.
tinue a long-term cooperative arrangement.
Moreover, what the seller learns by making the threat may now make
the seller herself more reluctant to continue trading with the buyer. Now
that the seller knows that the buyer knows that the seller can't be trusted,
the seller has less reason to trust the buyer. An unintended consequence of
the seller's threat is that the seller now realizes that he can no longer trust
the buyer. In retrospect, the seller may wish he had not made the threat,
but his threat is irreversible: How can the buyer ever not know? The
knowledge is irreversible?'
Once again, a mediator could communicate to the buyer the conse-
quence of no agreement without the threat becoming common knowledge.
The mediator doesn't need to directly suggest the consequence: "The sup-
plier might break off relations if you don't pay the higher price." It will
often be sufficient to ask the buyer: "What do you think will happen if you
don't reach this agreement? What do you think the supplier might do?
What would you do if you were the seller?" This type of mediation can be
effective precisely because it obscures the higher-order information. Even if
the buyer comes to realize that the seller may stop shipment without a
renewal, the seller does not know that the buyer has come to realize this.
Sometimes the role of the mediator can be played by the negotiators
themselves. One of the things that good negotiators often do is turn them-
selves into mediators. They get the other side to imagine what will happen
if they don't reach an agreement: "Think about what you would do if you
were in my shoes?" This process of getting the other side to imagine can be
even more effective if the person imagining doesn't reveal what he has
thought. To be effective, the seller doesn't need to know what the buyer is
thinking, and the buyer doesn't have to know that the seller knows, and
so on.
Of course, this example also highlights that obstructing common
knowledge to facilitate negotiation might also facilitate opportunistic
threats. Potential victims might want to commit to direct communication.
29. Going back to Table 1, the underlying bit of information ()) that the seller (Ian) is
trying to communicate to the buyer (Barry) is the possibility that the seller might not ship the
current order if the buyer does not agree to a price increase. The seller's direct threat com-
municates not only this bit of information to the buyer (lb), but the buyer also learns that the
seller knows (E) (2a).
30. In terms of Table 1, the seller's threat teaches the seller that the seller knows that the
buyer knows (g) (2b).
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If the parties understand that opportunism would become common knowl.
edge, they might act more civilly.
All of our examples are constructed to show how common knowledge
can impede settlement, but there are many contexts in which creating com-
mon knowledge is a goal of at least one of the parties. The powerful urge
to have your "day in court" is in part a desire to have the other side's guilt
(or your own innocence) become not only common knowledge between the
litigants, but to the public generally." Even in private negotiatiorm, it
may be important for me to obtain an explicit acknowledgment of your
prior wrongdoing before we proceed to a settlement.3
3. Example No. 5: A Gratuitous Threat
In this example, we turn to a case study showing how a direct threat
can cause a negotiation to unravel. The Harvard Negotiation Project
filmed a simulation of an "unscripted and unrehearsed" negotiation, enti-
tled "The Hacker/Starr Negotiation. ' 33  In this simulation, Hacker and
Starr were partners in a computer software joint venture. Hacker's job was
to come up with ideas and write the computer code; Starr was a dentist
who provided capital. The dispute concerned the rights to a screen-saver
program written by Hacker. Hacker claimed he owned the program
because Starr had repeatedly vetoed the idea (repeatedly), and because
Hacker had written the program on his own time. Starr claimed the joint
venture owned the program because it was written with a company com-
puter, and because the partnership agreement was broadly worded to give
the partnership the rights to any software written by Hacker.
The first portion of the mediation was a tremendous success. The
parties overcame the acrimony and rancor from a previous meeting and
31. See Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J.
1545 (1991). Hence in victim/offender mediation when mediators strongly counsel criminal
victims to "own their own feelings" (that is, not directly blaming the criminals), they may be
destroying value. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal Cases: A
Procedural Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247 (1994). In trying to preserve relationships, mediators at
times overlook the legitimate desires of individual negotiators to directly confront their adver-
saries and thereby make certain information common knowledge.
32. It is not enough that I know you acted badly and you know you acted badly. I may
want explicit acknowledgment that "you know I know" and "I know you know I know."
33. Videotape: The Hacker/Starr Negotiation (Harvard Negotiation Project 1985) (on file
with the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School). The two negotiators had previously
met neither their clients nor each other. Hacker and Starr were actors who were told the basic
simulated facts giving rise to the dispute and were only instructed to do "the best they could for
themselves."
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agreed in principle to continue their partnership with a warm sense of good-
feeling. They then began discussing how to divide the profits from the
screen-saver program. Hacker (who had been carefully trained/coached by
his negotiation adviser) tried to turn the discussion toward brainstorming
about possible options to resolve the remaining dispute. Hacker began by
suggesting the possibility of either arbitration or a 5% Starr/95% Hacker
split of the profits. The following conversation ensued:
Hacker: Arbitration is a good possibility.... And also, I've
already offered 5-95 and that's another option. But
maybe there're more [options]. Name more if you
think of one.
Starr: Well, one of the options is litigation that I could sue
you.
Hacker: Sue me?
Starr: Well, you wanted options.
Hacker: So, I will put that down. "Sue Allen." For what?
Starr: [Reading from paper] First of all, you breached your
contract. You disregarded the Board of Directors.
Managed poorly. You did not devote full time to the
company.... You caused a decline in the revenue of
the company.
Starr's insistence on explicitly stating his willingness to sue and explicitly
listing all of Hacker's bad acts almost ruined the deal. In the film, Hacker
became visibly despondent, slumping back in his chair and lowering his
head.
Starr's threat was gratuitous. It was already obvious that a suit was an
option. Hacker had been asking for only non-litigation options. The
parties had already agreed to the much more important aspects of the deal
(a new management structure and a new capital infusion). Starr was trying
to say: "Your BATNA is not as strong as you think." But the com-
munication was gratuitous because Hacker had already indicated that if he
was in Starr's shoes he would feel slighted (and would want to pursue liti-
gation). It was as if the dentist couldn't help but say: "Good thing that you
are finally being reasonable, because here are all the ways I was going to let
you have it if you weren't." Starr's statements almost killed the deal
because Hacker suddenly felt very uncomfortable continuing a long-term
partnership after Starr coolly described how close he had been to suing
Hacker. Hacker knew Starr was not currently planning to sue him (because
they had, in principle, decided to rededicate themselves to the joint ven-
ture)', but the very knowledge that Starr is the type of person who would do
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this told Hacker that maybe Starr was not the type of person with which he
wanted to have a long-term relationship. And more importantly for our
purposes, Hacker may have had trouble maintaining his concessions (for
example, the offer to arbitrate) once it becomes common knowledge that
his concessions were the by-product of an explicit litigation threat.
4. Example No. 6: A Threatening Lie-An Example of Second-Order
Communication
We end this section with a discussion of how a negotiator might re-
spond if she catches the other side lying in negotiation. Imagine you are a
supplier for a large corporate buyer. The purchasing agent for this cor-
poration comes to you and says: "If you don't lower your price, I will buy
from Acme who has offered me a 15% lower price." By some means, you
find out that the purchasing agent is lying. What should you do?
Your initial impulse might be to directly confront the purchasing agent
and say "you're lying." The purchasing agent has claimed (falsely) she has a
strong BATNA. But unlike our earlier examples, the response is not "Your
BATNA isn't as strong as you think," because the buyer already knows that
her BATNA is weaker than she has claimed. Instead, the impulse is to say
in effect, "I know what you already know (that your BATNA is weaker
than you've claimed)." Your impulse then is not to communicate first-
order information, but instead second-order information.34
The problem now is that conveying this second-order information-I
know that you know you are lying-may embarrass the purchasing agent in
ways that make it impossible for her to continue to buy from you. The
purchasing agent may be willing to lie but would be ashamed about having
been caught lying. And even if she isn't ashamed, for the sake of your
reputation, you may have to end the relationship: You can't let others
(even liars) know that you're the type of person who does business with
someone who is known to be a liar.
Instead of making the purchasing agent's lie common knowledge, it
might be more productive to respond with a "white lie' 3 of your own:
"Well, Acme may be able to cut its price, but I think that the quality of
34. In terms of Table 1, Ian is the purchasing agent; Barry is the seller, and the first-order
information C) is that the claimed Acme price discount is false. Because he is not a pathological
liar, Ian already knows that the claimed discount is false (la). Because Barry has independently
learned of Acme's true quote, Barry also knows that Ian's claim is false (lb). But Barry's impulse
is to let lan know that Barry knows the claim is false (2b).
35. For an insightful discussion on the ethics of "white lies," see Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The
Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75 IOWA L. REv. 1243 (1990).
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our product is better and I hope that in spite of the price difference, you'll
still be willing to continue buying from us." Even if there are no real qual-
ity differences between your own and Acme's goods, your white lie allows
the purchasing agent to "save face" 36 -to continue to buy from you with-
out her lie becoming common knowledge. If the purchasing agent comes
back and ultimately buys from you, she does not know that you know she's
a liar.
Of course, if the goods in question are really homogeneous com-
modities, the purchasing agent may guess that you have caught her in a lie.
But even then the white lie might facilitate trade because you won't be sure
whether she received the message. It's embarrassing enough for her to have
to buy from someone who knows she lied, but it's even more embarrassing
to buy from someone who knows she knows that she has been caught.
Thus, even if the white lie communicates second-order information (and it
might not), it can still facilitate trade by impeding the communication of
even higher-order information. It might be useful to let the purchasing
agent know that you are on to her, but keep yourself in the dark about
whether she ever got the message.
Here again a mediator could help implement a similar outcome. It is
much less embarrassing for a mediator to confront (perhaps indirectly) the
purchasing agent about the lie, because the purchasing agent will not have
to deal with the mediator on a long-term basis. The lie may become com-
mon knowledge between the mediator and the purchasing agent, but this
may be much less troubling than making the lie common knowledge
between the seller and the purchasing agent.17
B. Don't Claim So Much Because My BATNA Is Stronger than You
Think
It is often effective to educate the other side about the strength of your
BATNA. Instead of saying: "Don't claim so much because your BATNA
is weaker than you think," you might want to say: "Don't claim so much
because my BATNA is stronger than you think." Indeed, this was the
purpose behind the purchasing agent's claim (albeit false) in the last exam-
ple: My BATNA is stronger than you think it is (because I can get a great
36. In international diplomacy, giving your adversary an option to "save face" can be a way
of obscuring whether she has capitulated to your threat. See ERVING GOFFMAN, INTERACTION
RrrUAL: ESSAYS IN FACE TO FACE BEHAVIOR 6-7 (1967) (describing the nature of saving face).
37. The purchasing agent may be particularly averse to public knowledge of her lie if she
fears punishment from her superiors in the corporation.
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price from Acme if I don't buy from you), so you'd better claim less (that is,
cut your price).
Yet the reason why a speaker's BATNA is unexpectedly strong can be
just as much of a put-off as the reason why a listener's BATNA may be
unexpectedly weak. Accordingly, there may be times when a negotiator
will want to communicate first-order information explaining why her
BATNA is unexpectedly strong, but will not want this explanation to
become common knowledge. In such situations, as before, caucus media-
tion and indirect communications might be of use.
1. Example No. 7: Threatening Artificial Scarcity
One of the ways to increase your BATNA is to induce (or threaten to
induce) artificial scarcity. Imagine that Nintendo is negotiating with Toys
"R" Us ("Toys") over how to split $100 of profits on each of its video
machines for a particular Christmas shopping season.3" Nintendo might
begin the negotiation by revealing there is an unexpectedly strong demand
for its machines. Toys might respond that Nintendo still needs to use Toys
as a retail outlet if Nintendo wants to sell one million units this season
(Nintendo's total productive capacity). Accordingly, Toys could argue:
"We both need each other and therefore we should split the $100 profits
per machine."
In turn, Nintendo might threaten to reduce its productive capacity to
increase the strength of its BATNA. In essence, Nintendo would be say-
ing: "While we need you to sell one million units, if you don't agree to give
us more of the profits, we will only produce 750,000 machines. We won't
need you (or any other particular retailer) if we reduce our production. In
that case, you'll be scrambling to get any units that you can, and you'll be
happy to give us most of the profits. So you (Toys "R" Us) should agree to
38. A true-to-life narrative about Nintendo's marketing success is included in
BRANDENBURGER & NALEBUFF, supra note 25, at 111.
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let us have most of the profits, or we will create artificial scarcity which
means we won't need to deal with you at all."
As should be obvious by now, the problem for Nintendo is that while
it might want to communicate this first-order information to Toys, it might
not want this threat to become common knowledge. Toys might be reluc-
tant to continue a long-term relationship with a seller who knows that Toys
has caved in to a threat. 9 Moreover, making the threat common knowl-
edge may reduce Nintendo's ability to trust Toys' future marketing
efforts-after all, what kind of company is willing to continue dealing with
a supplier that opportunistically threatens to reduce quantity?
The larger point of this example is that negotiators will, at times, want
to communicate information not about what the speaker will do to reduce
the listener's payoffs absent an agreement, but what the speaker will do to
increase her own payoffs absent an agreement. Fisher and Ury explicitly
detail a variety of ways negotiators can strengthen their BATNA or weaken
those of the other side.4° To be effective, these BATNA changes must
not only be communicated, but must be communicated in a way that does
riot queer the deal. Direct communication that makes these threatened
BATNA changes common knowledge can ultimately be counter-
productive-hence creating the possibility for caucus mediation and indi-
rect communication to facilitate trade.
While we have focused almost exclusively on BATNA talk, nego-
tiators might also want to communicate about any of the other underlying
variables that affect distributive negotiations. For example, game-theoretic
models of bargaining often turn on the parties' cost of bargaining or degree
of rationality.4' And Jennifer Gerarda Brown in this symposium has sug-
39. Studies in experimental economics indicate that people will incur some loss in order to
punish others for unfair behavior. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit
Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. EcON. REV. 728 (1986).
40. See ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT
GvINo IN 183-84 (2d ed. 1991).
41. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Further Evidence of Discrimination in New Car Negotiations and Esti-
mates of Its Cause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 109 (1995).
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gested "satiation" and "optimism," theories of hope that might affect dis-
tributive negotiations. 42  One can easily imagine a negotiator saying:
"Don't claim so much" because:
(a) I'm less rational than you think;
(b) My bargaining costs are lower than you think;
(c) Your bargaining costs are higher than you think;
(d) I'm more optimistic than you think, etc.
To make these claims credible, the speaker will often have to explain why
the world is different than the listener thinks. Before providing direct
explanations, the wise negotiator will consider the ramifications of com-
municating higher-order information.
III. "VALUE CREATION" TALK
The common-knowledge problem can also be a barrier to integrative
bargaining. In integrative settings, parties have more to bargain about than
simply the price, because the joint gains from trade can be increased if non-
price terms are chosen wisely. Under such circumstances, it will often be
mutually advantageous for one side to communicate information of the
kind: "We'd have larger gains from trade, if you would (agree to) do X."
The problem is that ongoing relationships emphasizing that I would like
"X" often contain an implicit insult that you have been producing "not X"
in the past. Communicating the first-order information (containing this
implicit insult) facilitates integrative bargaining, but communicating higher-
order information can embarrass and erode the trust of both sides to the
negotiation.
A. Example No. 8: Misfeasance
Imagine you are negotiating an extended employment agreement with
your employer. You enjoy your job, but you would be happier if your boss
used (more effective?) deodorant. You know that she needs it, but she does
not use any. What should you do?
You could tell her directly. But by now, it should be obvious that to
do so would convey not only the first-order information of interest, but also
higher-order information: "I know that you need deodorant," and "You
know I know you need deodorant." The implicit fact that "your body odor
42. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Role of Hope in Negotiation, 44 UCLA L. REV.
1661 (1997).
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has bothered me in the past" can be insulting or embarrassing-especially if
it becomes common knowledge. It is easier to correct the problem and
preserve your relationship if the boss is not sure that you have identified
her odor as a problem, or at least if you are unsure whether the boss knows
you know.
Or consider the communication problem that Ian encountered with
his child's day care center. He wanted to communicate that he would get
more value out of the center if one of the caregivers would give more
detailed comments about his child's progress. But Ian was worried that if
his criticism became common knowledge (between this provider and him)
that everyone would feel uncomfortable. Ian's solution was to com-
municate using negative pregnants and what mediators call "flip sides."43
In his evaluation, he stressed how much he appreciated the comments of
the two other caregivers (negative pregnant) and instead of saying that he
disliked the generic comments of the third, he emphasized that he would
appreciate individualized comments about his child (flip sides). While the
caregiver probably understood Ian's first-order message, Ian does not know
for sure whether she knows his criticism, and moreover, she does not know
whether Ian knows that she knows it.
These are both (rather trivial) examples of "misfeasance," in that the
listener does not realize that she is doing something that reduces joint
value. And as in our previous examples, the speaker would like to tell
someone something they do not know without letting them know that the
speaker knows it (or without letting the speaker know that they know the
speaker knows it).
In these settings, a suggestion box or an anonymous note may have
done the trick. Even if the recipient can figure out who sent the note, a
sender will be uncertain about whether the recipient knows. Anonymous
notes and suggestion boxes can be useful because they may prevent the
dissemination of higher-order information.
In other situations, a speaker might want to use indirect or ambiguous
statements-taking a chance that the listener will not understand the first-
order message, but in return preserving a kind of "plausible deniability"
about higher-order information. In more serious contexts, a speaker might
even want to enlist the help of a mediator to send the message.
43. When a mediator uses "flip sides," she paraphrases a party's negative statement by trans-
forming it into a positive statement about what the party desires in the future. For example, if A
says "B is always late," the mediator might translate "A, you would like B to be more prompt."
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B. Example No. 9: Malfeasance-An Example of Second-Order
Communication
In contrast to the unintentional misfeasance of the last section, it is
sometimes useful for negotiators to communicate information about mal-
feasance. Imagine, for example, that a husband is having an affair. 4 The
husband already knows that he is being unfaithful. But unbeknownst to
him, his wife discovers his infidelity. The wife might want to tell her hus-
band that they could have a better relationship if he would be faithful. 45
In essence, she would be communicating second-order information: "I know
what you already know-that you are having an affair."46
But as in our previous examples, making the affair common knowledge
might cause the relationship to unravel. As an initial matter, the adul-
tering husband may be too embarrassed to continue. He might be too
ashamed to live with someone who knows that he had (or is having) an
affair. It is one thing to have acted badly but another to be caught. The
husband might be able to control how much guilt he feels, but he can't
control how much his wife will "guilt trip" him.
Moreover, common knowledge of the adultery might make the faithful
wife less willing to continue the relationship. She has to live with the fact
that her husband knows she knows and that she did not have the nerve to
do anything about it: What kind of person would just sit there and let her
husband have an affair and continue living with him? And so, the need to
show that she is not a wimp might force her to call it off.47
Direct confrontation changes the situation from "the husband knows
of the adultery" and "the wife knows of the adultery," to "the husband
knows the wife knows" and "the wife knows the husband knows the wife
44. We used a coin flip to determine the gender of the adulterer.
45. Unlike our earlier divorce example, the wife would not be threatening to divorce her
husband if he did not stop ("Your BATNA is weak because .... ). Rather she might just be
engaging in integrative bargaining ("We would have a more mutually beneficial relationship, if
you would....").
46. The malfeasance examples in this section are similar to the false-threat example
previously discussed. The seller was tempted to tell the purchasing agent about his lie (another
type of malfeasance): "I know what you already know-that you have acted badly."
47. We can go even further. The unfaithful husband might be willing to continue in a
marriage in which his wife knows that he has been unfaithful. But maybe he cannot continue in
a marriage in which his wife knows that he knows that she knows of his infidelity-and did
nothing about it.
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knows." These higher-order pieces of information can have destructive
consequences. 48
Indirect communication via a mediator or ambiguous statements by
the wife can, at the very least, let the husband know that his affair might
become known. Even if the mediator effectively lets the husband know
that his wife probably knows of the affair, the mediation can help preserve
the marriage by not letting the wife know that the husband knows she
knows, and so on.
While we have used adultery as our example, the same basic story
could be told with regard to other types of malfeasance. If an employer
finds out that her employee has been stealing (or intentionally shirking,
etc.), she might want to signal that she knows of the wrongdoing without
finding out whether the employee learns of the signal.
Or imagine a parent who has discovered that her teenager has tried
marijuana, but does not want the teenager to know she knows. If the
teenager's use becomes common knowledge, the parent would be forced to
punish or condone the behavior. Punishing would be hypocritical and
condoning would send the wrong message. Hence the best outcome is for
the parent to be informed (to monitor if the experimentation becomes a
problem), but not have the teenager know she knows.49
48. This suggests that if you learn that a friend has been the victim of adultery, perhaps you
should not disclose the adultery in a way that makes the malfeasance common knowledge
between the spouses. The consequences could be quite different if you disclose the adultery to
the faithful spouse and let him or her decide whether making the information common
knowledge is worthwhile. A similar argument might hold for other forms of malfeasance (such as
employee theft), except for third-party interests in deterring bad acts generally.
49. While homosexuality is not mal- or misfeasance, some homosexuals and lesbians want
their sexual orientation to be an "open secret"-meaning, they want their friends and relatives to
know they are gay, but they do not want their orientation to become common knowledge. In
some families if the "open secret" of a child's orientation became common knowledge, parents
would feel the need-for example, because of religious principles-to break off their relationship
or vocally criticize the child. See generally D. A. MILLER, THE NOVEL AND THE POLICE (1988).
Understanding the potential utility of preventing common knowledge also provides a justifi-
cation for President Clinton's "don't ask, don't tell" regulation of gays in the military. Judge
Eugene H. Nickerson in Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y., 1995), criticized this
regulation by arguing in part:
To "accommodate" the privacy of heterosexuals presumably means, for example, to
keep their naked bodies safe in the showers from the stares of homosexuals. But if
indeed there are homosexuals who wish to peek at naked bodies, they might do so quite
as readily when their orientation is a secret as when it is open. The only difference will
be that heterosexuals will not know which of their servicemates are homosexuals, and
heterosexuals will have reason to have a generalized suspicion of everyone in the
showers, hardly a circumstance likely to increase "cohesion."
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As we have shown, directly telling someone "you could do better in
the future" often implicitly communicates an insult, "you've been bad in
the past." But this direct statement, in turn, might impede settlement
because it might also communicate "I know you've been bad" and "You
know I know."
CONCLUSION
Critics might argue that only an article written by two economists
would go to such great lengths to show that threats and insults can impede
negotiation. But we have argued something more subtle. If these threats
and insults merely impeded trade, one could simply counsel-like the
Vaudevillian doctor50-to stop making such statements. Instead, we have
tried to illustrate types of information that negotiators will want to com-
municate to facilitate trade-but that can become destructive if the infor-
mation becomes "common knowledge."
One of the classic tough-guy responses to intimidation is the query: "Is
that a threat or a promise?" This question implicitly arises during nego-
tiations whenever one party describes what she will do if no agreement is
reached. While it is often difficult to distinguish threats from merely
describing the consequences of failing to reach agreement, our analysis
suggests that higher-order communication might be a necessary element of
what it means to threaten (or to insult)." Telling the other side about
how you will affect her BATNA is likely to be less threatening if she does
not know you know (or if you do not know she knows you know).
Mediators often work to increase the objectivity of negotiators. The
mediator may serve as an "agent of reality" or engage in "reality
checking"-making sure that each party knows both her own and the other
To suggest to heterosexuals that the secrecy policy will "accommodate" their pri-
vacy interests is to attempt to mislead them. They are not dunces or ostriches. They
can hardly be unaware that because of the passage of the Act homosexuals are serving
with them.
Id. at 978. But the regulation need not assume that heterosexuals are either "dunces or
ostriches." Bigoted officers might feel pressure to retaliate against any soldier whose homosexual
orientation becomes common knowledge. Even if bigoted heterosexuals know the identity of
homosexuals in the shower, preserving plausible deniability about their knowledge might foster
unit "cohesion." However, to see this potential benefit from the policy does not mean that the
benefits outweigh the (civil rights) costs.
50. "Doctor, my arm hurts whenever I lift it like this." "Don't lift it like that."
51. Communicating second-order information also seems to be a necessary component of
successful "irony." If Ian ironically tells Barry, "That paper was really good," part of Ian's intent
is not only for Barry to know that the paper is bad, but for them to share in the common-
knowledge joke that Ian intended just the opposite of what he said.
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side's BATNA. Yet the goal of increasing objectivity could be applied to
higher-order information as well. In a trade negotiation, a mediator or a
negotiation consultant might want to increase the seller's objectivity about
how the buyer perceives the seller. Besides making the seller understand
what her BATNA is, it can often be useful for the seller to understand
what the buyer thinks the seller's BATNA is. Even if the seller's BATNA
is actually weak, she may have more bargaining power because the buyer
thinks her BATNA is strong-and she can bluff her way to a favorable
agreement. Understanding the other's perceptions of you can be par-
ticularly difficult. The other side often does not know as much about you
as you do. And it's impossible not to know what you know." (This is
why you cannot play chess against yourself.)
Acquiring objectivity about others (and others' perceptions of you) is
difficult but does not necessarily require mediation. Mediators are not the
only ones who can serve as agents of reality; negotiation consultants, law-
yers, and friends can enhance someone's objectivity about herself, about
her perception of the other side, and about the other side's perception of
her. In theory "reality checks" could be done by each negotiator without
the help of a mediator or the other side.
The most difficult challenge is when a negotiator has private infor-
mation that could make the other side more objective. This Article has
attempted to show how communication between the parties can be used to
increase each side's objectivity. If you have a strong BATNA but believe
the other side's perception of you is mistaken, you will be tempted to say:
"My BATNA is stronger than you think" (or at other times: "Your
BATNA is weaker than you think"). Savvy negotiators will at times turn
themselves into mediators and try to increase the other side's objectivity in
ways that facilitate settlement. 3
Caucus mediation can play a central role in helping each side educate
the other. Controlling the flow of information between the parties is the
only uniquely mediative task. 4 But more objectivity is not always good.
Somewhat surprisingly, we have shown that mediators in many instances
should not strive to create better objectivity about higher-order knowledge.
52. Game-theorists succeed at doing this in highly reductive models. A player who knows
her own reservation price imagines how the other side-knowing only the distribution from
which the reservation price is drawn-would play.
53. Of course, we are unlikely to hear: "You're mistaken, my BATNA is weaker than you
think it is." But see supra note 26.
54. See generaUy Brown & Ayres, supra note 7. Caucus mediation is the most "alternative"
of the ADR techniques. It is the only dispute resolution method in which the parties do not
speak face to face.
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It is useful for a seller to be able to communicate to a buyer why the buyer's
BATNA is weaker than she thinks, but it can be destructive for this threat-
ening "why" to become common knowledge between the negotiators.
Game-theorists often model private information as the but-for cause of
inefficient distributive bargaining. In these simple bargaining models, if
each side's BATNA was common knowledge, the parties would
instantaneously (and costlessly) reach agreement. But we have argued that
while the lack of first-order information can impede trade, the presence of
higher-order information should at times be thought of as a barrier to nego-
tiation, a transaction cost that might be avoided by ambiguous or indirect
communication or by caucus mediation.
Our argument provides an economic justification not only for media-
tion, but for a host of communication techniques that are already in
use-such as "negative pregnants" and "flip sides." Our goal, however, is
to do more than merely translate current practice into economic jargon. 55
Instead, we believe that more explicit attention to "common knowledge
problems" can lead toward a better practice. In closing, we focus on two
take-home lessons.
First, in choosing between direct vs. indirect communication, nego-
tiators (and mediators) should focus on the tradeoff between first- and
higher-order information. The cost of ambiguous or indirect statements is
that the listener may not understand your primary (first-order) message, but
the benefit is that the first-order information is less likely to become com-
mon knowledge. The optimal degree of ambiguity should turn on the
relative size of these benefits and costs. Particularly in ongoing rela-
tionships, the costs of making threats and insults common knowledge may
outweigh the benefits of clear first-order communication. Mediation and
indirect communication can provide a useful, intermediate choice between
the extremes of silence or common knowledge.
Second, before speaking, negotiators should consider not only how
their speech will affect the perceptions of the listeners, but how speaking
will change their own perceptions (even if the listener says nothing in
response). Speaking changes your own information set, because now you
know that the listener knows something (and you know that the listener
55. See Mark C. Suchman, Translation Costs: A Comment on Sociology and Economics, 74
OR. L. REv. 257 (1995).
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knows that you know she knows, and so on).6 Once we gain higher-order
information by making a statement ("I know you're committing adultery,"
or "I will breach my contract if you don't agree to pay more"), we might be
forced to break off our relationship ourselves. Savvy negotiators not only
think about how their statements will change the other side's "frame," but
also, how their statements will necessarily change their own "frame." And
here, we are not talking about a cognitive bias story in which we might
react differently to a problem if it is framed as a gain or a loss, but instead,
we have shown that what you say irreversibly changes what you know.
56. We all know the witticism: "I could tell you X, but then I would have to kill you."
Almost always it means: "I would have to kill you because of your additional knowledge." But
we have shown that sometimes the phrase might mean: "I would have to kill you because of my
additional knowledge."
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